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Suicide in certain African contexts, such as in Ghana, is socially proscribed and 
subject to widespread moral condemnation. Not only is it illegal to attempt or com-
mit suicide in Ghana—making one vulnerable to criminal prosecution if unsuccess-
ful—but non-fatal suicide attempts are highly stigmatised to the point that individuals 
(and sometimes their family) are treated as social outcasts. A child will not be 
named after those who attempt or commit suicide for fears of contagion; sometimes 
they are refused a proper burial or the dead body may be whipped prior to removal 
[1]. As a social injury and violation of the common good, moral responsibility falls 
squarely on the shoulders of individuals and/or family members. These cultural 
norms are evident in the following narratives:
They beat me up mercilessly, hitting me with all kinds of objects—stones, sticks, using their 
hands. I was weak and tired...[I]t worried me a lot, the way I was disgraced, the fact that I 
had been a responsible worker before, with a bank … in fact I was traumatized very much. 
At a point I hid myself and was unable to even step out of the house [2, p. 276].
I was told I was not a part of the family again. During family discussions I was disal-
lowed to make contributions. Also even communal labor was very disturbing as people 
continued to avoid my company and make mockery of me when I attended it; hurling all 
kinds of insults at me. At a point I thought I should even try hard and end it all. You see you 
can really feel very bad after the action [2, p. 277].
In fact my experience after my suicide attempt was worse than what I was going through 
initially. It was like everybody turned against me. I thought after the attempt people will be 
caring and supportive. But they were rather judgmental, they insulted and even my friends 
did not welcome me into their fold. Each time I visited them in a group I felt abandoned 
because it was like no one wanted to associate himself with a person who wanted to kill 
himself [2, p. 277].
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Shame associated with falling short of societal expectations around financial secu-
rity and masculinity can also motivate suicide attempts:
I took a loan from Barclays [Bank] and one other from Ghanafin, a private financial institu-
tion that deals with loans … So, Barclays takes from my salary and Ghanafin too … so I 
went to the bank on Monday thinking I will get something small to take and they said my 
account has been closed!…I blame myself for all these…I feel ending my life will resolve 
all these … my creditors will soon start chasing me … the shame and all that …Man, 34 
[3, p. 239]
The phenomenology around male suicide in Ghana reveals a complex, potentially 
contradictory web of communitarian values that are thought to be central to African 
personhood—or what it means to be identified and recognised as a person with a 
certain moral status. Crucially, African personhood is a socially attained status that 
reflects the extent to which one is embedded within communal values. By implica-
tion, individuals who violate social norms central to group cohesion and well- 
being—such as proscriptions against suicide—warrant moral condemnation and 
blame. Such individuals relinquish (or possibly never attained) the social status of 
personhood; equally, however, strong gender norms implicitly sanction suicide 
over shame.
This contradiction could lead to charges of incoherence against the so-called 
‘traditional’ African communitarian values around personhood. However, this chap-
ter points to important internal resources within African thinking which encourages 
critical reflection of values that disregard the humanity of individuals. The Akan1 
tradition of critical sankofaism can help illustrate how African cultural values often 
contain important internal normative resources capable of responding to problem-
atic views of shame and male gender norms which make suicide appear as the 
only option.
10.2  Suicide and Social Values around Gender
In Ghana, suicide is an act of musuo—extraordinary, uncommon, and indelible evil 
‘which brings suffering… to the whole community, not just to the doer alone’; as 
such, it is a complete abhorrence to the community [4]. As illustrated above, survi-
vors are subject to intense moral condemnation, labelled sinner transgressor, outcast 
antisocial, or criminal, and viewed as deserving social sanction and abuse. Actions 
that are musuo reveal a flawed moral character in Akan moral thought and practice; 
individuals who attempt or commit suicide are therefore thought to reveal a 
1 Akan refers to one of the major ethnic groupings within Ghana and its conceptual schema and 
moral practices have been systematically theorised in the African philosophical tradition. In this 
chapter, I use Akan and African interchangeably—this is not to deny the fact of plural and diverse 
cultures and traditions within Africa. But I follow Gyekye [9] in his assertion that there are similar 




fundamentally evil character which lacks consideration and responsibility to family 
members and the communal good.
Male suicide is also closely connected to gender norms around avoiding shame. 
Fears of experiencing dishonour, disgrace, and moral sanction are deeply embedded 
in Akan moral practice. Various moral maxims describe how disgrace leads to a 
sense of shame: ‘It is unbecoming of the Akan to be in disgrace’ (or ‘Disgrace does 
not befit the Akan’: animguase mfata okanniba) [4, p. 139]. Fear and avoidance of 
shame function as strong motivation to act in accordance with social-normative 
expectations. Another maxim states powerfully, ‘Given a choice between disgrace 
and death, one had better choose death’ (aniwu ne owu, na efanim owu) [4, p. 139].
The shame of failing to meet certain masculine norms has been found to prompt 
fatal and non-fatal suicidal acts, as clearly illustrated in the man facing financial 
difficulties [5]. Local sayings promote certain male character traits, such as courage 
and bravery in adversity: ‘a man doesn’t cry’ (כbarima nsu); ‘a man does not fear 
death’ (כbarima nsuro owuo); ‘it’s a real man who takes bitter medicine’ (כbarima 
na כnom aduro a ɛyɛ nnwono) [5, p. 658]. These societal expectations of mental 
invincibility and physical strength in the face of suffering ‘coincide with a gen-
eral cultural prohibition against men’s public expression of such emotions as fear, 
anxiety, pain or sadness, which are interpreted as forms of weakness’, making it 
‘unmasculine for a man to express or admit feelings of weakness and emotional 
dependency’ [6, p. 475].
Social expectations further uphold masculine ideals of sexual potency, procre-
ation, and providing economically and materially for one’s family; achievement of 
these ideals constitute successful male identity in society. By contrast, those in role 
reversals—where women function as economic providers—are described as ‘use-
less man’ (כbarima hunu) and subject to social stigma [5]. Virility and sexual prow-
ess are likewise important. The ultimate test of masculinity is to have one’s own 
biological children; impotency and childlessness are met with ridicule accordingly. 
Failure to achieve valued masculine identities and socially expected roles is a cause 
for low self-esteem, a sense of personal failure, defeat, and entrapment [5]. Shame 
around loss of social status generates feelings of defectiveness and helplessness, 
leading to fatal or non-fatal suicidal behaviour.
Rather ironically, the motivation behind male suicide reveals a strong identifica-
tion with societal norms and expectations associated with what it means to be a 
valued male person in the community, as well as the internalisation of the blame 
directed towards individuals who fail to fulfil those norms. The depth to which these 
are internalised can paradoxically undermine the resiliency that is socially expected 
of male individuals. Obstacles and frustrations in fulfilling social responsibilities 
(procreation, economic provision, etc.) cause substantial anxiety and the per-
ceived—and sometimes real—loss of dignity. A man’s exaggerated sense of per-
sonal responsibility and self-blame for his own failure accurately reflects social 
norms where shame and disgrace are tantamount to the loss of personhood. In short, 
‘local axioms […] seem to provide tacit approval for men to use suicide for address-
ing shame’ [5, p. 663]. Suicide appears to be a fully coherent response, confirmed 
even by commonplace proverbs.
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10.3  Communitarianism of African Personhood
The priority of the community over the individual is frequently cited as a distinc-
tive feature of African personhood, particularly in comparison to Western indi-
vidualism. Menkiti describes that ‘persons become persons only after a process 
of incorporation. Without incorporation into this or that community, individuals 
are considered to be mere danglers to whom the description ‘person’ does not 
fully apply’ [7, p. 172]. Menkiti’s formulation lends itself to a strong constitutive 
reading of communitarianism, whereby ‘the individual self is defined by, inte-
grated into, and constituted in the community by the organic processes of accul-
turalisation, socialisation, moral education, and ritual integration’ [8, p. 1010]. 
This strong reading contains two notable features: first, personhood is a norma-
tive social concept in the sense that the achievement of moral personhood comes 
only with the ability to fulfil one’s communally-determined duties and responsi-
bilities [8]. This normative conception of personhood presumes that developing 
persons are inculcated within a society that prioritises certain values surrounding 
one’s pre-eminent responsibility to one’s family and community, which become 
manifest in moral character and behaviour aligned with such commitments. 
Second, personhood is a socially attained status rather than a presumption of 
human species membership: the achievement of personhood is proportionate to 
one’s participation in communal life and the extent to which the different obliga-
tions of one’s social role are fulfilled [7].
The attainment of personhood clearly depends on the integration of communal 
values so that one acts within the constraints and possibilities of what is socially 
acceptable, making norms of personhood and sociocultural context mutual reinforc-
ing. An individual’s understanding of self, responsibilities, and actions must embed 
the values and interests of one’s community. Recognition of a person can then be 
contingent on conformity with and the achievement of socially determined bench-
marks of success. Conversely, ‘the decline in the values of a person […] may also 
indicate a decline in the values or culture of the community of which the person is 
part’ [8, p. 1008]. All persons therefore share responsibility in contributing to the 
welfare of the community. The moral status of personhood is earned when social 
norms are properly internalised and social obligations are fulfilled as an upstanding 
member of the community [9]. Whether individuals observe or disregard their duties 
to the social community can mean the attainment, diminishment, or even loss of 
one’s status of personhood. Thus, the communal context shapes individual selves 
while also evaluating who deserves the status of personhood based on their compli-
ance to socially expected norms.
On this account, failures to carry out socially expected obligations and roles are 
viewed as instances of personal irresponsibility, callousness, or generally vicious 
character. The Akan belief that habitual actions influence the development of one’s 
moral orientation overall means that ‘one is […] responsible for the sort of person 
one is [and] the state of his or her character’ [9, p. 150]. Falling short of the criteria 
of personhood is therefore morally blameworthy because such actions disclose the 
wrong normative orientation towards oneself and one’s community.
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Yet the case of male suicide lays bare the incoherence at the heart of this strongly 
communitarian conception of personhood: what drives the behaviour of the indi-
viduals in the case studies above is not a rejection of social responsibility or disre-
gard for the community, but rather an intense sense of personal responsibility 
towards fulfilling socially informed norms and roles, particularly associated with 
gender. For example, the failure to realise male norms related to economic security 
engenders the self-blame pervading in the man’s narrative above, making suicide 
preferable to social ostracisation. If anything, such examples demonstrate how the 
overidentification with and internalisation of socially constituted duties and norms 
can lead to the very circumstances, motivations, and behaviours that impede the 
achievement of normative personhood. The worry, then, is that values of African 
personhood seem to imply ‘a cramped and shackled self, responding robotically to 
the ways and demands of the communal structure’, thereby potentially perpetuating 
and worsening the underlying issues associated with male suicide [9, pp. 55–6]. 
Moreover, a constitutive account of personhood would have to admit that the failure 
of individuals to act in a manner aligned with personhood lies partly with the com-
munity’s values, practices, and incorporation rituals.
This suggests that reflective mechanisms need to be in place to encourage the 
critical examination of African traditions, particularly in the examination of poten-
tially destructive but socially affirmed norms related to mental health, gender, and 
personhood. But rather than abandon the communitarian values of African person-
hood altogether, we must tease out ways in which its humanistic core can temper 
and limit the demands of the community. Important internal resources are present 
within Akan moral thinking which would help challenge some of the more perni-
cious implications of strongly communitarian African values.
10.4  Critical Sankofaism
The case of male suicide may tempt one to reject the communitarian basis of per-
sonhood altogether and presume that critical analytical resources need to be 
imported from Western frameworks. African practices and conceptual schemas are 
often reduced to a static, unreflective tradition while those from the West are seen as 
removed from tradition. Yet this disregards the fact that Akan thinking contains cru-
cial critical resources that belie this mischaracterisation of African social practices 
and traditions as stagnant and unthinking. The Adinkra symbol of sankofa is par-
ticularly fruitful in this context: visually depicted as a mythical bird flying forward 
while looking back, sankofa communicates the philosophy of retrieving lost or for-
gotten gems from the past as one moves forward; it involves reclaiming parts of 
African practice, history, and standpoints that have been hidden or distorted [10].
At times the pursuit of sankofa has  been interpreted as endorsing the blind 
revival of African cultural values, leading to the uncritical adoption of the past or 
certain traditions simply by virtue of it symbolising the renaissance of an African 
tradition and putative subversion of the Western colonial legacy. This naïve sanko-
faism presumes that African values and ways of life are normatively valuable in a 
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wholesale sense and are capable of being revived in a pristine, authentic, and 
precolonial form. Yet as Gyekye explains, just as the sankofa bird will spit out 
rotten seed going forward, so too should approaches to traditional cultural values 
be critically reflective in ways that consider their functionality and appropriate-
ness to fundamental human needs in contemporary life, captured in the Akan 
proverb that ‘A person cutting a path does not know that the past that he has 
cleared behind him is crooked’ [9, p. 262]. Critical sankofa is therefore a process 
of reclaiming cultural values through the critical evaluation which leads to the 
reflective endorsement or  rejection of past practices or traditions. It demands 
being conversant with cultural forms to grasp the deeper meanings and possibili-
ties immanent from that tradition; equally it requires a way of working dialecti-
cally between one’s experiences and needs in the present and the critical 
interpretation and retrieval of worthwhile values and wisdom from the past. In 
other words, critical sankofa involves the reflective sifting through, refining and 
pruning of, different aspects of the cultural past, to determine whether it warrants 
a place in the current scheme of things. Those values that ultimately deserve rec-
lamation and revival will promote attitudes, practices, and behavioural patterns 
that are conducive to the attainment of basic human needs—thus functioning as a 
potential framework for development [9].
Critical sankofa therefore provides an important normative framework internal 
to African cultural schemas, enabling the critical evaluation of problematic dimen-
sions of shame, disgrace, and gender norms within African communitarianism that 
are manifest in the phenomena of male suicide in Ghana. The core ideals of African 
communitarianism rest on socioethical values of  solidarity, interdependence, 
mutual aid and obligation, yet, as Gyekye states, ‘[t]he communitarian social 
arrangement, as established and practiced in African cultures, has, however, 
spawned some features that have thrown the worthwhileness and continuity of the 
arrangement in its old form into question’ [9, p. 252]. Problematic masculine ideals 
and communitarian social arrangements coalesce to some degree, as male norms 
are closely connected to one’s  ability to  fulfill one’s responsibility to meet  the 
needs of group members. Such responsibility is difficult to bear unless one pos-
sesses economic wealth and influence [5, 9], meaning values associated with male 
economic power—and shame when one falls short—intermingle with the commu-
nitarian sense of self and one’s sense of belonging in deep ways. Yet through the 
lens of critical sankofa it becomes clear that sociocultural values of what ‘being a 
man’ amounts to—reinforced tacitly in  local idioms around the preferability of 
death to shame—corrupt rather than capture the humanism at the core of African 
communitarian values. Patriarchal expectations associated with economic viabil-
ity, sexual prowess, and male potency distort the ways in which the needs of the 
community are to be fulfilled (i.e. support for the needs of those less fortunate, the 
promotion of familial ties, etc.), and indeed, devalue the human being who is sub-
ject to such expectations.
To see this, one has to understand the humanism that is the basis of African com-
munitarian personhood. The highest worth of and consideration owed to a human 
being is expressed in the Akan proverb, ‘It is the human being that counts; I call upon 
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gold, it answers not; I call upon cloth, it answers not; it is the human being that counts’ 
[9, p. 258]. To value a person as a human being involves expressing virtues of compas-
sion, generosity, and a sense of moral duty to assist others to benefit their interests and 
welfare. It is to ‘acknowledge that her worth as a human being is equal to our own and 
that there are some basic values, ideals, and sentiments (such as hopes and fears) that 
we all share by virtue of our common membership in the human species’ [9, p. 259]. 
The community must therefore uphold and embody certain humanist and egalitarian 
norms of moral regard, care, and concern for others, which function as the normative 
framework that enables individuals to actualise the potentiality of attaining the status 
of personhood. As Nyerere describes, ‘In traditional African society […] we took care 
of the community, and the community took care of us … Nobody starved, either of 
food or of human dignity’ [8, p. 1008]. Individuals are presumed to have certain psy-
chological characteristics, such as the ability to make deliberative, freely willed 
choices, and can be held responsible for fulfilling obligations towards others and one’s 
community as such. Each individual likewise possesses intrinsic worth such that one 
should ‘care for her well-being or needs just as she cares for the needs of others’ so 
that ‘altruistic concerns cannot obliterate responsibilities to the self’ [9, p. 69].
Thus, from the perspective of critical sankofa there is a clear disconnect between 
the sociocultural norms around masculinity which engender shame when one falls 
short as opposed to the core virtues expressed in valuing human beings and develop-
ing and meeting basic human needs. Returning to the opening narratives, the man 
who had survived a suicide attempt anticipated and hoped for care and support but 
was met instead with bitter condemnation and isolation by both his family and com-
munity. Meeting the challenge of male suicide in Ghana will therefore  involve 
counteracting and critically challenging harmful dimensions of sociocultural norms 
around gender and promoting understanding of those who attempt suicide—recog-
nising how social ostracisation devalues the intrinsic value and needs  of human 
beings, as well  as distorts the tradition of mutual aid, compassion, and empathy 
embedded in the humanistic core of African communitarianism.
10.5  Conclusion
Critical sankofa is an important process which evaluates and retrieves what is worth-
while about the humanism that grounds African community and personhood. The 
critical reflexivity of critical sankofa challenges pernicious distortions of African 
values in the context of suicide, as well as more generally the exoticisation and 
static characterisation of African traditions and values. Critical sankofa also has 
important implications beyond this context: although discussed as an internal 
African resource, this approach has clear similarities to Western hermeneutical 
frameworks that situate current practices within a historical, interpretative tradition. 
The hermeneutical process involves working dialectically between the acknowl-
edgement and critical evaluation of traditions and cultural practices through the 
prism of contemporary questions and needs. Western discourses that medicalise sui-
cide can ignore how such behaviours represent a ‘life crisis situation’ where 
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individuals and their environment interact in dynamic ways, and as such, critical 
scrutiny of Western sociocultural values and norms around gender are put to one 
side. A hermeneutical approach modelling a similar process to that of critical 
sankofa could promote greater reflection on the distorted values, practices, and tra-
ditions that can devalue human beings and motivate suicide within Western cultures.
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